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Abstract
Time preferences, study effort, and academic performance**
We analyze the relation between time preferences, study effort, and academic 
performance among first-year Business and Economics students. Time preferences 
are measured by stated preferences for an immediate payment over larger delayed 
payments. Data on study efforts are derived from an electronic learning environment, 
which records the amount of time students are logged in and the fraction of exercises 
completed. Our third measure of study effort is participation in an on-line summer course. 
We find that impatient students show weaker performance, but the consequences are 
relatively mild. Impatient students obtain lower grades and fail first sit exams more 
often, but they do not obtain significantly fewer study credits, nor are they more likely 
to drop out as a result of obtaining fewer study credits than required. We find a weak 
negative relationship between impatience and study effort. Differences in study effort 
therefore cannot explain impatient students’ lower academic performance.
JEL classification: D03, D90, I21
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1 Introduction
People are often confronted with the choice to take a costly action now in
order to obtain a benefit in the future. Although people generally tend to
attach less weight to future outcomes than to present outcomes, there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in how individuals behave in those kind of situations.
It has been found that experimental measures of individuals’ time prefer-
ences correlate with their alcohol consumption, smoking behaviour, body
mass index (Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; Chabris et al., 2008; Sutter et
al., 2013), and credit card borrowing (Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Diﬀer-
ences in individuals’ time preferences may also help to explain the extent to
which individuals are successful in education. Ultimately, being successful in
education requires putting in eﬀort. Individuals’ choice of eﬀort typically in-
volves an intertemporal trade-oﬀ: eﬀort costs of studying an additional hour
are incurred immediately, while the benefits materialize in the future. We
would therefore expect that impatient individuals exert less eﬀort, resulting
in lower educational attainment and performance.1
A number of recent papers find evidence in line with this hypothesis.
Kirby et al. (2005) find that, in a sample of undergraduate students of two
American colleges, impatient students have significantly lower grade point
averages. Cadena and Keys (2012), using panel data representative for the
US population, show that individuals who are classified as impatient by their
interviewer, are more likely to drop out from high school and from college.
Golsteyn et al. (2014) link individuals’ time preferences measured at age 13
with several outcomes in later life, up to 40 years later. They conclude that
individuals who make impatient choices at age 13 obtain lower grade point
averages in compulsory school and high school, and are less likely to graduate
from both high school and university. De Paola and Gioia (2013) find that,
in a sample of Italian university students, impatient students obtain lower
grades, while they find no diﬀerences in the number of study credits earned
three years after enrollment.
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by investigating the rela-
tion between time preferences, study eﬀort, and academic performance. In
contrast to previous studies, we explore data on actual study eﬀorts rather
than analyzing data on study outcomes only. We collect information on
study eﬀorts of 799 first-year Business and Economics students for an oblig-
atory course in quantitative methods. An interesting feature of this course
is that students are supposed to practice the course material in an elec-
tronic learning environment, which automatically records for each student
the amount of time logged in, as well as the percentage of exercises solved
without help of the electronic assistance tools. We use this information as
1For a more general discussion on the role of time discounting in human capital invest-
ment, see Becker (1962) and Ben-Porath (1967).
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our first two measures of study eﬀort. A third measure of eﬀort is voluntary
participation in an on-line summer course that addresses deficiencies in ba-
sic mathematical skills. To investigate how impatience relates to first-year
academic performance, we use four diﬀerent performance measures: the av-
erage grade obtained in the first sit exams (i.e. excluding results obtained in
re-examinations), the number of first sit exams failed, the number of study
credits obtained during the first year, and whether students fulfill the univer-
sity’s requirements for first-year performance. The consequences of failing
to meet those requirements are severe, namely exclusion from the study
program. We measure time preferences by a survey question that confronts
students with three hypothetical choices between an immediate payment of
1000 or a larger delayed payment, the respective amounts being 1100,
1050, and 1250.
By analyzing study eﬀorts in addition to study outcomes, we provide
more direct evidence on the existence of a causal relationship between time
preferences and academic performance. Establishing causality is challenging
if not impossible, as there is typically no exogenous variation in time pref-
erences that can be exploited. A promising alternative strategy is therefore
to investigate the channel underlying the relation between time preferences
and academic performance, namely whether and to what extent impatient
students actually exert less eﬀort. This yields more direct evidence, which
is important as study outcomes may be correlated with time preferences
for other reasons than study eﬀort. For instance, a consistent finding in
the literature is that impatience is negatively correlated with measures of
intelligence, see, in addition to the literature cited above, Frederick (2005),
Shamosh and Gray (2008), Dohmen et al. (2010), and Castillo et al. (2011).
As a result, to the extent that ability is unobserved or measured with error,
the negative impact of impatience on educational attainment and perfor-
mance may be overestimated. Although the estimated relation between
impatience and study eﬀort may also be prone to bias for the same reason,
this possible bias most likely leads to underestimation of the eﬀects, as we
would expect that less able students study more hours. As another exam-
ple, impatient students’ weaker educational performance may be driven by
ineﬀective learning habits, rather than by fewer actual study hours. For
those and similar reasons, the cleanest way to test the hypothesis that im-
patient students exert less study eﬀort, resulting in lower performance, is by
employing direct measures of study eﬀort.
We find that impatience is associated with weaker academic performance
and less study eﬀort, but the evidence is not unambiguous. Impatient stu-
dents are less likely to complete almost all exercises provided by the elec-
tronic learning environment, but they are not significantly less likely to
participate in the summer course, and we find no evidence that they study
fewer hours. This seems hard to reconcile with some of our findings on
the relation between time preferences and academic performance. Specifi-
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cally, we find that impatient individuals obtain lower grades, and fail a first
sit exam more often. Students who always prefer the immediate payment
are estimated to fail 28% more exams than other students, amounting to
0.5 additional failed exam per academic year. However, the eﬀects become
insignificant and ultimately disappear when the consequences of bad perfor-
mance are more severe. Our point estimates suggest that impatient students
are less likely to obtain all first year’s study credits, but this eﬀect is not sta-
tistically significant. Also, we find no evidence that impatient students are
less likely to fulfill the university’s performance requirements. So, we show
that impatience has no severe immediate consequences, and that the diﬀer-
ences in study eﬀort between patient and impatient individuals are rather
modest. Possibly, the eﬀect on grades and failed first sit exams is somewhat
overestimated, as we find a clear negative correlation between impatience
and measures of ability, in line with existing studies.
Our findings suggest that impatient students make rational trade-oﬀs:
they accept lower grades and a higher probability of failing an exam, but
they are not willing to accept substantial study delay, let alone being forced
to abandon their studies as a result of insuﬃcient performance. The conse-
quences of impatience are therefore relatively modest. This is well in line
with the results of De Paola and Gioia (2013), who find that impatience
is reflected in lower grades, but not in higher dropout rates or fewer study
credits. However, our result stands in remarkable contrast to the results
of Cadena and Keys (2012) and Golsteyn et al. (2014), who find that
impatience is associated with important life-lasting consequences, such as
higher dropout rates and lower educational attainment. Moreover, Cadena
and Keys (2012) report substantial evidence for dynamically inconsistent or
impulsive behavior. A possible reason for those diverging findings is that
Cadena and Keys (2012) and Golsteyn et al. (2014) investigate represen-
tative samples of the general population, whereas both De Paola and Gioia
(2013) and we concentrate on university students. Arguably, time prefer-
ences have more dramatic eﬀects on behavior in the general population, as
more intelligent individuals, like university students, may have developed
eﬀective ways to curb impulsive tendencies, or may be better able to foresee
the possible consequences of impatient behavior.2
We also analyze by means of a simple theoretical model, how the eﬀects
of impatience on study eﬀort depend on ability and the functional form of
the marginal benefits of eﬀort. Based on this model, we repeat our analyses
by ability, as measured by the score on a math entry test, but we find no clear
diﬀerences between students of high and low ability. Moreover, we estimate
the relation between time preferences and study eﬀort for diﬀerent levels
2Alternatively, the distribution of time preferences is much wider in the total popula-
tion. However, Andersen et al. (2010) compare time preferences in a sample of university
students with those in the general population, and find that the distributions do not diﬀer
that much.
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of understanding of the course material, as our theoretical model predicts
that impatience is more relevant when students do not fully master the
course material. Again, we find no diﬀerences. We also discuss several
possible explanations for our finding that impatient students show weaker
exam performance, while they do not seem to put significantly less eﬀort into
their studies. For instance, impatient students may study less eﬀectively, or
put in less eﬀort in dimensions we cannot observe. The explanation that
is most in line with the evidence is that the eﬀect on grades is somewhat
overestimated, as impatience is negatively correlated with ability, which
is typically imperfectly measured. In our analyses we control for, among
others, risk aversion, as risk attitudes may be related to time preferences
(Anderhub et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2010; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012;
Sutter et al., 2013).
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the background of our
study and the data used in the analysis. Then, in section 3, we present the
main analysis and results. Section 4 describes a simple theoretical model,
and describes the results of the robustness checks we conduct on the basis of
our theoretical framework. In section 5, we discuss possible interpretations
of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data description
2.1 Background
Our sample consists of all first-year students enrolled at the start of the aca-
demic year 2012-2013 at the School of Business and Economics of Maastricht
University. We collected data on their study behaviour during an introduc-
tory course in quantitative methods, abbreviated as QM1. This course is
obligatory for all students who are enrolled at the School of Business and
Economics of Maastricht University and takes place the first period of the
academic year. The course has a special place in the curriculum. Students
enrolled at the School of Business and Economics are required to obtain at
least 34 out of 60 course credits in their first year, and in addition pass at
least one of the two courses in quantitative methods oﬀered in the first year.
Students who fail to meet those criteria receive a so-called ‘negative binding
study advice’ (BSA), implying that they have to leave their study program,
and are excluded from the study program for six years.3 Hence, students
face strong incentives to pass this course.
The course consists of 7 weeks of lectures and tutorials, followed by a
written exam. The aim of the course is to provide students with a basic
understanding of mathematics and statistics. Attendance of lectures is not
3All universities in the Netherlands have similar regulations, although the exact per-
formance requirements diﬀer by university and department.
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obligatory. Tutorials at Maastricht University are organised according to the
principles of problem-based learning, which involves lots of collaboration in
small groups of students to solve unstructured, often open-ended, problems.
Students are supposed to take the lead in discussing the problems, while the
teacher has a facilitating role, see Wilkerson and Gijselaers (1996) for a de-
tailed description. Tutorial groups are therefore small (at most 14 students),
the tutor being either a staﬀ member or a teaching-assistant. Students are
required to attend at least 7 out of 9 tutorials.
The exam consists of 40 multiple choice questions. Students who fail
the exam have the opportunity to retake the exam two months later, right
after the exams of the courses taught in the second period and after the
Christmas holidays. Students who passed the first sit exam are not allowed
to participate in the resit. As a preparation for the exam, students have
the opportunity to participate in three midterm tests, which allow them to
acquire a bonus score of at most 20% of the maximum score in the final
exam. These midterm tests are administered on the computer. Final exam
grades are always expressed on a scale 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), where 5,5
is the minimum grade required to pass the exam. The final passing rate in
our sample is 92%, and 77% of students passes after the first attempt.
A special feature of this course is its use of an electronic learning envi-
ronment, MyLab, which accompanies Pearson’s textbooks in mathematics
and statistics.4 Students are supposed to use MyLab to practice the course
material and prepare for the midterm tests. MyLab improves the eﬃciency
of the learning process when students are heterogeneous in terms of prior
education. Every week, students are supposed to solve a set of problems
related to the topics covered in that week. Each topic is introduced by a
test problem to assess existing skills and knowledge. Students who master
the material will solve the problem, and move on to the next topic. Stu-
dents who do not fully master the material may ask for assistance ("Help
Me Solve This"), or for a step-by-step work example ("View an Example").
Students will continue receiving similar problems until they are able to solve
them without the use of the assistance tools. When they succeed, they au-
tomatically move on to the next topic. Students who do not manage to
solve the problem without use of the electronic assistance tools may decide
to move on to the next topic manually. Students who completed all topics,
but nevertheless feel that they need additional practice, can restart a topic,
in which case MyLab provides new, similar exercises. A topic is considered
completed when a student managed to solve the problem without help of the
electronic assistance tools at least once. So, all students deal with the exact
same topics, but students diﬀer in the number of exercises, and hence time
4Pearson oﬀers MyLab applications in several disciplines. The course Quantitative
Methods 1 uses mathematics and statistics applications, named MyMathLab and MyS-
tatLab, respectively. See http://www.mymathlab.com and http://www.mystatlab.com
for further information.
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needed, to complete each topic, as well as the number of topics completed,
and the number of additional exercises after a topic has been completed.
MyLab records the fraction of topics completed, as well as the total number
of exercises provided. Furthermore, MyLab records the amount of time each
student is logged in. The system automatically logs oﬀ after 30 minutes of
inactivity. MyLab is an important course tool, as it provides a particularly
good preparation for the midterm exams.
Other data were collected by means of a number of on-line questionnaires
during the course period. Those questionnaires were mainly concerned with
student motivation and learning styles.5 In the final week of the course,
students had to write an assignment in which they compare their responses
with the average responses on a number of these questionnaires’ items. As
a result, all first-year students filled out these questionnaires. We measured
risk and time preferences in the questionnaire administered in week 6 of the
course.
2.2 Performance measures
We collected information on students’ performance in the course QM1, as
well as information on performance in all other first-year courses. In case
of QM1, we investigate two measures of performance: the first sit exam
grade, and whether a student passed or failed the first sit exam. We do not
consider results obtained in the resit exam, as it is cleaner to focus on the
results obtained in the first sit exam: all students take the exact same test
and have the same opportunities to prepare.
For all other courses, we have four measures of performance. In anal-
ogy with our performance measures in the course QM1, we investigate the
grade point average (GPA), weighted by the number of study credits, of
all first sit exams, as well as the number of first sit exams failed in the first
year. Further, we investigate the number of course credits (ECTS) obtained,
and whether a student receives a negative binding study advice, i.e. drops
out as a result of failing to meet the performance requirements explained
above. These measures diﬀer in the time horizon over which negative conse-
quences of weak performance materialize, the probability with which those
consequences will be realized, and the severity of those consequences. The-
oretically, we would expect that the relation between grades and patience
is stronger than the relation between passing the exam and patience, as the
benefits of obtaining a higher grade materialize in the remote future, while
failing an exam has more immediate consequences.6 Likewise, we would
5Students were informed that these data would remain confidential, and used in anony-
mous format for research purposes as well as improvement of QM1 education. Research
using these data is described in Tempelaar et al. (2012, 2013a, 2013b).
6On the other hand, a substantial number of students do not have the ambition to
obtain a high grade, but primarily care about passing the course. When those type of stu-
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expect that impatient students are willing to risk failing an exam, but not
if failing will lead to a negative binding study advice (BSA). Stated other-
wise, when failing an exam significantly increases the risk of failing to meet
the BSA criteria, we would expect that the expected benefits of eﬀort are
so high that a rational student exerts maximal eﬀort regardless of his time
preferences. When impatient students are more likely to receive a negative
BSA, we can interpret this as an indication of self-control problems.
2.3 Eﬀort
Our first measure of eﬀort is the total amount of time a student is logged
in in the electronic learning environment, MyLab. The main advantage of
this measure is its objective and precise measurement. As we shall see, time
logged in in MyLab has strong predictive power for the first sit exam grade
QM1. The median amount of time spent in MyLab is about 7 hours per
week. This is a substantial part of their total study time, as students are
supposed to spend 20 hours per week on this course, including obligatory
attendance of 3 hours of tutorials. A potential limitation is that a student
does not need to be active in MyLab during the time he is logged in: only
after 30 minutes of inactivity a student is automatically logged oﬀ. The
actual study time is therefore measured with error. This seems not a se-
vere problem, however, as time logged in in MyLab is strongly related to
the number of exercises generated by MyLab (pairwise correlation: 0.51),
suggesting that students who are logged in are generally active during that
time. None of our results change qualitatively when we use the number of
exercises provided instead of time spent in MyLab.7 A second limitation is
that we do not observe study eﬀorts outside MyLab, for instance studying
written course material or attending lectures. However, study eﬀorts in and
outside the electronic learning environment are unlikely to be substitutes,
as time spent in MyLab also has strong predictive power for grades obtained
in other courses, as we shall see.8
Since accurate measurement of eﬀort is essential, we have two other mea-
sures of study eﬀort. The first measure is based on practice results in the
electronic learning environment. As explained above, MyLab does not only
record the amount of time spent, but also keeps track of the fraction of prob-
dents constitute the majority, we expect stronger eﬀects of impatience on the probability
of passing the exam than on the exam grade obtained.
7We do not use the number of exercises provided as a measure of eﬀort, as it may
be sensitive to diﬀerences in learning style (e.g. trial and error), and it ignores the time
students spend studying while trying to solve an exercise. The correlation with grades is
therefore somewhat lower.
8As a robustness check, our questionnaire in week 6 asked students to indicate the
average total number of hours spent on the course QM1 each week. As self-reported
measures may suﬀer from potentially important biases, we do not present results using
this measure. Results are qualitatively similar when we use this measure.
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lems the student manages to solve without electronic assistance. As MyLab
records this information separately by week and subject (math and statis-
tics), we sum the scores (i.e. the fraction of topics completed) obtained over
the 6 weeks and rescale them to 0-100% scale.9 Importantly, this measure
addresses the two potential limitations of time spent in MyLab, as it reflects
the intensity of study and, to a lesser extent, study eﬀorts outside MyLab.
A disadvantage of this measure is that the fraction of topics completed also
depends on ability. However, this seems a minor issue, as the diﬃculty level
of the exercises is relatively low, and students can infinitely practice and ask
for assistance when attempting to solve a problem. Succeeding in solving
an exercise without help of the assistance tools is therefore primarily a mat-
ter of eﬀort. This is reflected in a high median score (92.2%) and a strong
correlation with the amount of time logged in in MyLab (0.60, see Table 1
below).
The third measure of eﬀort is participation in an online summer course
that takes place each year during the three months preceding the start of the
academic year. The university oﬀers this course in response to increasing
numbers of students that start their studies with a deficiency in mathemat-
ics. The course is advertised at the web pages describing the Economics
and Business study programmes, and at a web page that oﬀers practical
information for prospective first-year students. Moreover, all students who
receive their proof of admission are informed about the course by email.
Participation is voluntary, but recommended for students who were on a
high school track involving little mathematics, which is about 2/3 of our
sample. Students can take a 10-15 minutes online entry test to identify
deficiencies in their mathematical skills. The course takes about 80 hours
of study, depending on pre-existing knowledge, and is entirely online.10 In
2012, costs of participating were 50.
2.4 Time preferences
Data on time and risk preferences were collected by means of the online
questionnaire that was administered in week 6 of the course. Specifically,
time preferences were measured with the following hypothetical question:
Suppose someone you fully trust oﬀers you a gift of 1000 today. How-
ever, he tells you that you can wait for one year and receive 1100 instead.
Which would you prefer?
a) 1000 now
9This procedure is preferable over calculating the unweighted fraction of completed
topics, i.e. dividing the sum of completed topics by the total number of topics. The
reason is that the number and diﬃculty level of exercises diﬀers by week and subject. Our
procedure ensures that weeks with few, but diﬃcult exercises get a higher weight.
10For further information, see http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Faculties/SBE/Theme
/Departments/QuantitativeEconomics/Floating_Pages_QE/OnlinePreparatoryCourses.htm
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b) 1100 in a year from now
This question was repeated two times, where the postponed amount was sub-
sequently changed to 1050 and 1250. The idea behind those questions
is that most individuals prefer the immediate payment when the delayed
payment is low, but switch to the delayed payment when the latter amount
is high enough. The amount for which individuals switch to the delayed
payment is our measure of impatience. Hence, we can distinguish between
individuals who always prefer the delayed payment (most patient), those
who switch when the amount is 1100 or 1250, and those who always pre-
fer the immediate payment (most impatient). Out of the 882 students who
filled out our questionnaire, 20 students did not answer this question, while
7 individuals provided inconsistent answers, and are therefore dropped from
the analysis.11 We decided to use hypothetical payoﬀs rather than real mon-
etary payoﬀs, because our budget would limit the expected amount at stake
to only a couple of euros. We do not think that when the stakes are so low,
introducing real monetary payoﬀs would lead to more accurate measurement
of preferences for present over future consumption, as consumption at any
point in time will not be influenced by such low amounts. Falk et al. (2013)
show that that non-incentivized measures of patience strongly correlate with
incentivized measures obtained in the lab, see Dohmen et al. (2013) for a
similar result on a self-assessed measure of impatience.12
2.5 Ability/prior education
It is important to correct for intelligence and, relatedly, prior education, as
both are potentially correlated with time preferences and study behavior.
As mentioned in the introduction, a consistent finding in the literature is
that time preferences are related to measures of intelligence. Likewise, when
patient students spend more time on their studies in secondary education,
they can be expected to enter university with more skills and knowledge,
which gives them a head start in the course QM1. We employ two measures
of intelligence and prior education. The first is the score on an entry test that
took place the first week of the course. The test aimed to assess existing skills
and knowledge and consisted of 21 multiple choice questions: 14 questions
on mathematics and 7 on statistics. From the performance on this entry test,
we construct two measures, one equating the number of correct answers in
the mathematics part, the other one equating the number of correct answers
11Answers are considered as inconsistent when an individual prefers the postponed pay-
ment when this amount is relatively low, while preferring the immediate payment when
the postponed payment is even larger.
12 Incentivizing the measurement of time preferences is common in lab experiments (e.g.
Kirby et al., 2005; Dohmen et al., 2010; Castillo et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2013), but
uncommon in surveys (e.g. Cadena and Keys, 2012; De Paolo and Gioia, 2013; Golsteyn
et al., 2014).
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in the statistics part. The reason for keeping the two parts separate is that,
although they both reflect to some extent intelligence and prior education,
they measure diﬀerent things. The first measure captures mathematical
ability, which can be expected to be correlated with measures of IQ. The
second measures statistical knowledge, which is less suitable as a proxy for
IQ, but rather reflects diﬀerences in high school education.13
The second measure of ability is a dummy which takes value 1 if an
individual followed an advanced mathematics track in high school.14 Apart
from prior education, this variable may also proxy for intelligence, as more
intelligent individuals are more likely to choose a mathematics major in high
school.
2.6 Control variables
As noted in the introduction, time preferences may be related to risk prefer-
ences (Anderhub et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2010; Andreoni and Sprenger,
2012; and Sutter et al., 2013). It is therefore important to take risk pref-
erences into account. Our measure of risk preferences is taken from the
German Socio-Economic Panel and asks for individuals’ stated willingness
to take risks in general. It is measured on a 7-point scale, where 1 means
highly risk averse and 7 fully prepared to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2011)
and Vieider et al. (2013) show that this measure predicts actual behavior in
incentivized lottery experiments, that it is correlated with risky behaviors in
several domains, and stable across cultures. Therefore, despite its subjective
nature, this seems an adequate measure of risk preferences in our setting.15
The questionnaire we administered in week 6 asked students to give their
best estimate of their expected exam grade for this course. This question
was incentivized as follows. Students whose estimated grade was within
0.25 points of their actual exam grade, participated in a lottery, in which
two winners were randomly drawn. Both winners received a book voucher
13This is apparent from the fact that the score on the statistics part is hardly related
to our performance measures, in contrast to the score on the mathematics part, see Table
1 below.
14A mathematical level is classified as advanced when it is the highest or one of the
highest mathematical high-school levels oﬀered in the country, i.e. vwo-b (Netherlands),
Leistungskurs (Germany), international baccalaureate math hl (international baccalaure-
ate), or mathmajor (self-identified by students as a high school math track).
15We also measure attitude towards risks and losses by means of two paid financial
lottery questions. However, as it turns out, a large number of subjects gives an inconsistent
answer: 155 out of 882 students (18%) did not report a unique switching point in both
or either of the two questions. Substantial fractions of inconsistent decision makers are
not uncommon: Harrison et al. (2002), and Meier and Sprenger (2010) find that 4% and
11% of adult subjects were inconsistent, respectively. In a sample of children (at most 16
years old), Bettinger and Slonim (2007) and Castillo et al. (2011) find that more than
30% of their subjects are inconsistent. To avoid losing those observations, we decided not
to include those variables in the analysis and use the subjective measure only. Including
the incentivized measures does not aﬀect the results qualitatively.
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worth 20 euros. We chose to pay the winner a book voucher rather than
plain money, because a book voucher is perhaps more likely to be perceived
as a suitable prize. We use this information as a further indicator of ability
and eﬀort.
Maastricht University attracts sizeable numbers of foreign students, partly
because of its location close to the Belgian and German border, but also be-
cause of the language of instruction (English), and its distinct educational
philosophy. In our analyses, we include dummies for the most prevalent
nationalities to capture cultural diﬀerences and diﬀerences in educational
systems.16 Throughout, we also include dummies for the study program:
Economics, Fiscal Economics, or International Business. Moreover, we col-
lected measures for anxiety, persistence, and self-belief. Those measures are
all constructed from the Student Motivation Scale (Martin, 2009).17 Finally,
for the course in quantitative methods we have information on the tutorial
group each student belongs to, as well as on the identity of each group’s
tutor. When possible, we include an indicator variable on whether the tutor
was a staﬀ member or a teaching assistant.
2.7 Descriptive statistics
Our final sample combines two datasets: students who filled out the ques-
tionnaire (882 obs.) and students who were recorded in the electronic-
learning environment (910 obs.). Virtually all first-year students occur in
at least one of the two datasets, and 868 students occur in both datasets.18
We exclude 7 students for whom the e-learning environment recorded more
than 30 practice hours of mathematics or statistics in at least one of the
weeks, which is probably a recording error. We also eliminate 27 individuals
who did not provide a valid answer (i.e. an inconsistent answer or no an-
swer at all, see above) to our questions measuring time preferences. Finally,
16We measure nationality rather than the country in which the student obtained his or
her high school diploma. However, we observe that very few students obtain a diploma
abroad. For instance, despite Maastricht being close to the Belgian and German border,
only one of the 54 Belgian students and only 1 out of 458 German students obtained a
Dutch high school diploma. In fact, just two of the 169 students with a Dutch high school
diploma in our sample do not have the Dutch nationality. Conversely, just 4 students with
Dutch nationality obtained a German diploma.
17Each concept was measured by four items. Examples of these items are: "When exams
and assignments are coming up, I worry a lot" (anxiety); "If an assignment is diﬃcult, I
keep working at it trying to figure it out" (persistence); "If I try hard, I believe I can do
my university work well" (self-belief). See Martin (2009) for details.
18 Information from the exam administration on exam results and participation gives us
some idea about the sample attrition. We identify 13 first-year students who do not occur
in either of the two datasets. Further, we lose 42 cases who occur in one of the datasets,
but not in both. 70% of those students obtains zero ECTS during the first year, another
10% passes exactly one course. We therefore think that it is fair to say that those students
made a wrong study choice, and should therefore not be included in the sample, as we
will argue above.
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we exclude 2 repeat students from the sample, and 33 students who leave
the School of Business and Economics before Christmas.19 The reason for
this latter requirement is that we are not interested in the relation between
time preferences and making a correct study choice, and therefore exclude
students who obviously made a wrong study choice. This leaves us with a
sample of 799 observations. However, since not all students gave complete
and consistent answers to all questions, the final number of observations in
the analysis depends on the variables included.
Table 1 shows the pairwise correlations between the most important vari-
ables. This provides valuable information about the quality of our measures
of study eﬀort. The first thing to note is that our measures of eﬀort are sig-
nificantly positively correlated. In particular, as noted above, time logged
in in MyLab is highly related (r=0.60) with the percentage of topics com-
pleted. This is a clear indication that solving the exercises is primarily a
matter of eﬀort rather than ability, although the correlation with the entry
test score on mathematics is sizeable (r=0.21). Further, this indicates that
students are generally active during the time they are logged in. As a sec-
ond indication of the quality of our measures, the time spent in MyLab as
well as the percentage of topics completed are significantly correlated with
the grade obtained in the course QM1 (r=0.15 and r=0.53, respectively).20
Importantly, the correlation with other measures of academic performance
is in the same order of magnitude and often even stronger, suggesting that
our measures of eﬀort are also related to eﬀort exerted in other courses. The
relation between participation in the summer course and academic perfor-
mance is weaker, which is probably due to lower (unobservable) ability of
summer course participants.
A number of other relevant observations can be made from Table 1.
First, impatience is significantly negatively correlated with most measures
of performance (ECTS and BSA being the expectations), but not with any
of the eﬀort measures. As we will see, this largely corresponds to the findings
19For financial reasons, the majority of repeat students do not have an individual li-
cense for MyLab. Hence, only two repeat students are recorded in the electronic learning
environment.
20 In fact, the correlation between time spent in MyLab and the grade obtained in the
course QM1 depends strongly on the percentage of topics completed. The correlation is
0.20 for students who completed a below median number of topics (i.e. less than 92,2%)
and —0.30 for students who completed an above median number of topics. This negative
relation remains when we control for pre-education and entry test scores. The reason is
that relatively unable individuals need more time to solve nearly all exercises than more
talented individuals. Students who need more time to reach a given level of understanding
can therefore be expected to obtain lower grades. We will only a observe a positive relation
between study time and grades to the extent that individuals who spend more time on
their studies on average reach a higher level of understanding. This condition is satisfied
for low levels of understanding, when studying an additional hour leads to significant gains
in understanding, but not when understanding of the course material reaches a natural
maximum.
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in the regression analyses described in section 3. Second, in line with existing
studies, students who perform better on the mathematics entry test are less
impatient (r= —0.13). Interestingly, the grade in the course QM1 is highly
predictive for grades in other courses (r=0.70) and academic performance in
general. It is therefore safe to assume that the relation between impatience
and actual study eﬀort carries over to other courses, which is also in line
with the strong positive correlation between measures of eﬀort in the course
QM1 and performance in other courses.
Figure A1 in the appendix shows the distribution of the answers to the
time discounting question. Figure A2 shows the distribution of the math
entry test scores, which is somewhat flatter than the normal distribution, but
nicely symmetric. Figures A3-A8 display the distributions of the dependent
variables used in the analyses, except for the binary variables passed first
sit exam QM1 and participation in the summer course. About 77% of the
sample passes the first sit exam QM1, and 20% participates in the summer
course.
3 Results
3.1 Performance
We first investigate the relation between impatience and performance in the
course QM1, where performance is measured by first sit exam grades and
the probability of failing the first sit exam. The analysis of performance in
the course QM1 is of particular interest, as we analyze the relation between
impatience and study eﬀort in the context of the course QM1. Then, we
analyze other measures of academic performance in the first year in order
to compare our results with those of the existing literature.
3.1.1 Performance in the course QM1
Table 2 reports the results of a Tobit estimation of individuals’ first sit exam
grade QM1 on their discount rates. As a significant fraction of students ob-
tain the highest possible grade (see figure A3 in the appendix), we use a
Tobit model to account for the right-censoring of the data.21 In all analy-
ses, we use dummy variables to estimate the eﬀect of time preferences. We
distinguish between three patience categories, based on individuals’ switch-
point in the time discounting question. The base category is formed by
relatively patient individuals, namely individuals who always prefer the de-
layed payment and individuals who switch to the delayed payment when
the amount is 1100. The reason for combining the two relatively patient
categories into one category is that we do not have enough observations in
21We obtain similar results when we use OLS. Six students did not show up for the first
exam QM1, and are treated as missing.
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the most patient category to obtain precise estimations.22 We use dummies
because we do not know individuals’ exact discount rate, but only the upper
and/or lower bound. Moreover, the eﬀect of individuals’ discount rate on
the dependent variable need not be linear.
The first column of Table 2 shows that the most impatient category of
individuals obtains a significantly lower grade than the reference category,
correcting for gender, age, study program, tutor quality, and nationality.
The eﬀect is not only statistically significant, but also meaningful in eco-
nomic terms: the diﬀerence is about 1.1 point on a 10-point scale. The
diﬀerence between the reference category and the category of individuals
who switches when the delayed payment is 1250 is much smaller, and sta-
tistically significant only at the 10% level. This eﬀect becomes insignificant
once we add controls. In the second column of Table 2, we control for
students’ ability by adding their score on the entry tests and their score
squared, taken in deviation from its mean,23 as well as a dummy for having
obtained a mathematics major in high school. In line with existing studies
(Cadena and Keys, 2012; De Paola and Gioa, 2013; Golsteyn et al., 2014),
the point estimate decreases in magnitude, but remains sizeable and sta-
tistically significant. Next, we add controls for risk attitude and measures
of personality, as time preferences are potentially correlated with risk atti-
tudes and personality traits. We find a negative relation between students’
self-reported willingness to take risks and their grade, while anxiety is also
negatively associated with the grade QM1. This, however, has only a minor
impact on the estimated eﬀect of time preferences.
The key question is whether diﬀerences in impatient students’ grades can
be attributed to diﬀerences in study eﬀort. As a first step in analyzing this
question, we add controls for participation in the summer course as well as
for time spent in MyLab, where we allow for decreasing returns by adding
time spent in MyLab squared.24 As grades are ultimately a function of ef-
fort and ability, there is no theoretical reason why time preferences would
be related to grades after controlling for eﬀort and ability. The estimates
are shown in column 4 of Table 2. The coeﬃcient of the most impatient cat-
egory of individuals is unaﬀected. This suggests that impatient individuals’
relatively weak performance cannot be attributed to impatient individuals
22We also did all our analyses with a separate dummy for the most patient category.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the two most patient categories are typically very similar.
Results are available upon request.
23Throughout, squared terms are taken in deviation from their mean in order to prevent
multicollinearity.
24The results are very similar when we replace total time spent in MyLab by time spent
on mathematics and statistics separately. Also, we estimated a model that includes the
interaction between time spent in MyLab on mathematics and statistics and the entry test
scores on both subjects, as well as entry test scores squared. These interaction terms are
typically insignificant, regardless whether both linear and quadratic terms are included,
or just one of the two.
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exerting less eﬀort. In column 5, we further control for eﬀort and ability
by adding individuals’ expected grade and the percentage of topics com-
pleted.25 Although these variables add substantial explanatory power, their
inclusion has only a minor eﬀect on the estimated relation between patience
and the exam grade QM1. So, as hypothesized, we find a negative relation
between the exam grade QM1 and impatience, which is completely driven
by the category of most impatient individuals. This relation can partially
be explained by impatient individuals’ lower ability and lower study eﬀorts,
but far from completely.
Arguably, the relation between patience and grades is stronger than the
relation between patience and passing or failing the exam, as the benefits
of obtaining a higher grade materialize in the remote future, while failing
the exam has more immediate consequences. Table 3 presents the results
of estimating a probit model, where the dependent variable takes the value
1 if a student failed the first sit exam QM1, and 0 otherwise. Coeﬃcients
report mean marginal eﬀects. Column 1 shows that individuals who always
prefer the immediate payment have a 12.5 percentage point higher estimated
probability of failing the exam than the reference category, correcting for
gender, age, study program, tutor quality, and nationality. This eﬀect is
substantial, as only 23% of our sample fails the first exam QM1. The point
estimates become smaller when we add controls for ability, risk attitude, and
other personality characteristics (columns 2-3). Still, the eﬀect sizes remain
substantial in absolute terms, and remain statistically significant at the 10%
level. Again, correcting for study eﬀort (columns 4 and 5) does not aﬀect
the estimated eﬀect of impatience.
3.1.2 Performance in other courses
An important question is to what extent the relation between patience and
study results in the course QM1 is representative for other courses. To an-
swer this question, we examine the relation between patience and academic
performance in other first-year courses than QM1. Our first measure of per-
formance is the GPA, i.e. the ECTS-weighted average of the exam grades
obtained in all first year courses except QM1. We only consider exam grades
obtained in the first attempt and exclude results obtained in the resit.26 We
25We drop the quadratic terms of time spent in MyLab. The time spent in MyLab should
be largely irrelevant after controlling for the percentage of topics completed, because what
matters is a thorough understanding of the course material, and not so much the time
needed to reach that particular level of understanding. This also explains the (small)
negative eﬀect of time spent in MyLab: students who spent more time to complete a
certain fraction of topics, are probably of lower (unmeasured) ability. We obtain similar
results when we divide the percentage of topics completed by the time spent in MyLab,
thus creating an additional measure of ability.
26Results are similar when we investigate average final grades, i.e. including the resit
results in the average. This is unsurprising, given that the correlation between the average
15
estimate the model using OLS, as the distribution of the GPA is not cen-
sored, see figure A4 in the appendix.
The first five columns of Table 4 show the results of regressing the GPA
on the same set of controls as before (except for tutor quality). The first
thing to note is that, regardless of the exact specification, the most impatient
category of individuals obtains significantly lower grades than individuals
who are more patient. In fact, the relation between patience and the GPA
is virtually the same as the relation between patience and the grade obtained
in the course QM1. The estimated eﬀect sizes are similar after standardizing:
correcting for ability, risk attitude, and personality, the expected grade of
the most impatient students is about one quarter of a standard deviation
lower than the expected grade of the reference category, both in the course
QM1 and in all other courses. In this sense, the relation between patience
and grades we observe in the context of QM1 seems highly representative
for other first year courses.
The second thing to note is that although our measures of ability and
eﬀort are obtained in the specific context of QM1, they are strongly related
to the average grade obtained in other courses. The measures of ability
jointly add substantial explanatory power, as shown by the diﬀerence in R2
between columns 1 and 2. The various measures of eﬀort are related to the
GPA in the same way as when the grade QM1 is the dependent variable.
Those results confirm the intuition we derived from inspecting the simple
correlations between variables (Table 1), namely that our measures of ability
and eﬀort are very well able to explain academic performance in the first
year. Nevertheless, the negative relation between impatience and grades
does not vanish after controlling for ability and eﬀort, see columns 4 and 5
of Table 4. The relation becomes statistically insignificant only when we add
the grade obtained in the course QM1 as explanatory variable, see column
6 of Table 4. By doing so, we extensively control for eﬀort and ability. The
grade QM1 is strongly (t=18.3) related to the GPA obtained in all other
courses, and the R2 is increased from 0.41 to an impressive 0.60. However,
since the grade QM1 also depends on time preferences, it is unclear whether
the relation between GPA and patience becomes insignificant because we
perfectly control for eﬀort and ability, or because of multicollinearity. In
any case, the results reported in Table 4 show that impatient individuals
obtain lower first sit exam grades, and that this cannot easily be explained
by diﬀerences in eﬀort and ability.
Next, we assess whether impatient students’ lower GPA also translates
into a higher probability of failing an exam. Specifically, we count the num-
ber of courses (other than QM1) in which a student failed the first sit exam,
conditional on participating in that exam. Not participating in the first sit
exam of a course is not considered as a failed exam, since we do not know
grade based on first sit and final grades is 0.98.
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the grade the student would have obtained if he had participated.27 We
estimate a negative binomial count model that corrects for exposure to the
number of first sit exams taken. The estimation results, presented in the
first two columns of Table 5, are comparable with the results on GPA: stu-
dents who belong to the most impatient category fail more first sit exams.
The eﬀect is sizeable: the most impatient category fails about 28% more
exams than the reference category, which amounts to 0.5 additional failed
exam per academic year. Thus, the most impatient individuals do not only
obtain lower grades in the first sit exams, they are also more likely to fail
these exams.
An important question from the perspective of social welfare is whether
impatient students obtain fewer ECTS in the first year. This is not im-
plied by lower performance in the first sit exams: impatient students may
perform relatively well in the re-examinations, and consequently obtain a
similar number of ECTS as less impatient students. As the distribution
of ECTS is naturally bounded between 0 and 60 ECTS, with the majority
(54%) of students obtaining the highest possible number of ECTS and a neg-
ligible (2%) number obtaining zero ECTS, we first estimate a probit model
where the dependent variable equals 1 when a student passes all courses,
and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.
The most impatient category of students has a roughly 11 percentage point
smaller chance of passing all first year courses than the reference category
(column 3). This is a substantial eﬀect, given that 54% of the sample obtains
60 ECTS. However, the estimated eﬀect reduces to 7 percentage points when
we control for ability, risk attitude, and personality, and is no longer sta-
tistically significant (p=0.15). Moreover, the eﬀect seems restricted to the
extensive margin (i.e. obtaining all ECTS or not). When we estimate an
OLS regression on the sample of students who do not obtain all ECTS, we do
not find any relation between impatience and the number of ECTS obtained
(see column 5 of Table 5). Unreported regressions show that this result con-
tinues to hold when we exclude students with particularly bad performance
in terms of the number of ECTS obtained (using various thresholds), and
when we exclude students who fail to meet the BSA requirements. Also, we
do not find a statistically significant relationship when we combine intensive
and extensive margin by estimating a count model.28 So, although the most
27Clearly, students who do not show up at the exam may do so for a specific reason.
For instance, students may stay at home because they expect to fail anyway, or because
their strategy is to take the resit exam later in the year, as the additional time allows for a
better preparation. We therefore checked whether participation in a course’s initial exam
is related to impatience, and do not find a statistically significant relation between the
two. We also redid our analysis assuming that students who did not participate, failed
the exam. This does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
28We also find no diﬀerences between high and low ability students, as measured by their
math entry test score. More generally, we will analyze the interaction between impatience
and ability in more detail in section 4.
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impatient category of students unambiguously shows worse performance in
first sit exams than more patient students, this is not clearly reflected in a
lower number of ECTS.
In columns 6 and 7 of Table 5, we analyze the relation between receiving
a negative BSA and impatience. We estimate a probit model where the
dependent variable equals 1 if a student received a negative BSA, and 0
otherwise. We find no indication that impatient students are more likely to
receive a negative BSA than more patient students. In fact, the estimated
coeﬃcients of the impatience dummies are small relative to the percentage
of students who receive a negative BSA (14% of the sample), and typically
go in the opposite direction from that predicted by theory. So, although
highly impatient individuals show generally weaker academic performance,
this remains without severe negative consequences by the end of the first
year. This suggests that impatient individuals’ lower performance is not
due to severe self-control problems, but that there seems to be some rational
trade-oﬀ underlying their relatively weak performance.29 Notice that this
result is inconsistent with the results reported by Cadena and Keys (2012)
and Golsteyn et al. (2014), who find that impatient individuals are more
likely to drop out of high school and college. Of course, we cannot rule out
that impatient students are more likely to drop out after the first year, but
as drop out rates among students who survived the first year are relatively
low, it seems safe to conclude that impatient students in our sample are
not more likely to drop out as a consequence of putting in too little study
eﬀorts.30
3.2 Study eﬀorts
3.2.1 Time logged in in MyLab
In this section, we test the hypothesis that impatient individuals actually
exert less study eﬀort. As described above, we employ three diﬀerent mea-
sures of study eﬀort: recorded time logged in in MyLab, the percentage of
topics completed, and participation in the on-line summer course, respec-
tively. We use quantile regressions to estimate the relation between time
logged in in MyLab and impatience, as the distribution of the dependent
variable is highly right-skewed, see Figure A7. Using quantile regression
instead of OLS makes the results more robust to outliers.31 Table 6 reports
29 In line with this interpretation, we find that impatient individuals pass resit exams
more often, but they do not generally obtain higher grades in resit exams.
30For instance, of the cohorts of students who started a Business study at Maastricht
University in 2005, 22% dropped out in the first year (107 students). Of the remaining
students, only 4% dropped out in subsequent years (15 students).
31Results are similar when we use the log of time spent in MyLab or an indicator variable
for spending an above median number of hours as dependent variable. Likewise, using
OLS instead of quantile regressions does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
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the estimation results. In columns 1-3, we estimate our basic specifications
with the usual controls. Controlling for ability, we observe no statistically
significant diﬀerences between individuals with diﬀerent switchpoints. Also,
the point estimates are very small, given that the median number of hours
spent in MyLab is 43 hours. In column 4 of Table 6, we add participa-
tion in the summer course to the regression. One might be concerned that
when impatient students participate in the summer course more often, they
need less study time during the course, leading to an underestimation of the
eﬀects of impatience. This, however, is not the case. The estimations re-
ported in column 4 show that the qualitative results are not aﬀected by the
inclusion of summer course participation as a control variable. Note that
students who participate in the summer course in fact spend much more
time on their studies, as these students can be expected to be less able and
more motivated than seemingly identical students.
In column 5 of Table 6, we check the robustness of this result by excluding
a number of outliers. In particular, we exclude all observations in which a
student was logged in more than 20 hours in one of the weeks on one of
the subjects (i.e., math or statistics), or more than 4 times the standard
deviation from the mean in that week if this number exceeds 20 hours (which
occurs in 4 out of 12 subject-week combinations). This criterion replaces the
milder original criterion of more than 30 hours on one of the subjects in one
of the weeks. The results are largely unaﬀected by the exclusion of these 17
outliers. Unreported regressions show that we obtain similar results when
we exclude students who were logged in for more than, respectively, 100, 80,
or 60 hours in total: there is no clear relationship between time preferences
and time logged in in MyLab.
3.2.2 Score on problems solved
Next, we assess the relation between impatience and the percentage of top-
ics completed in MyLab. As many students manage to solve most of the
problems (median: 92.2%), we distinguish between students with an above
median score and a below median score. We estimate a probit model, where
1 refers to students with a score above the median. The estimated mean
marginal eﬀects are reported in the first three columns of Table 7. Impatient
students are estimated to be 10 percentage points less likely to obtain an
above median score than the reference category, even after correcting for
ability, risk attitude, and personality. This result, however, is not very ro-
bust. In column 4 of Table 7, we distinguish between students who complete
all topics (16% of the sample), and those who do not. We do not find a sta-
tistically significant relationship. In column 5, we concentrate the analysis
on individuals who complete a below median number of topics. We regress
the percentage of topics completed on time preferences, demographics, abil-
ity, risk attitude, and personality, conditional on solving less than 92.2% of
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the problems. We do not find any relation between time preferences and the
percentage of topics completed. We obtain a similar result when we confine
the sample to individuals who solve less than 100% of all topics (regression
is not reported). So, we find a negative association between impatience and
the percentage of topics completed in MyLab, but only on a rather specific
margin, namely completing almost all topics or not.
3.2.3 Participation in summer course
Finally, we investigate how time preferences relate to participation in the
online summer course. Table 8 presents the results of estimating a probit
model, where the dependent variable equals 1 when a student participated in
the summer course. The first two columns show estimates on the full sample.
We observe no statistically significant diﬀerences between impatient students
and the reference category. Unreported regressions show that students who
always prefer the delayed payment are estimated to be 9 percentage points
more likely to participate than less patient students, and that this eﬀect is
significant at the 5% level. However, when we compare students who always
prefer the delayed payment with the most impatient category, the diﬀerence
is not statistically significant.
One might argue that the relationship is stronger for students with a
weak background in mathematics. Theoretically, students weigh the costs
and future benefits of participating in the summer course. One would expect
that students with a better high school education in mathematics perceive
both the benefits and the eﬀort costs as lower. As individual diﬀerences
in time discount rates play a larger role when future benefits are high, we
would expect a stronger relation when we restrict the sample to students
with a weak background in mathematics. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8,
we restrict the sample to students who were on a high school track in which
mathematics was a major or a minor subject, respectively. Contrary to our
expectations, we find no relation in the sample of students with a weak
background in mathematics. If anything, it seems that among students who
took a major in mathematics, the most patient students are more likely to
participate. When we combine the two most impatient categories into one
dummy, the diﬀerence comes close to significance (p=0.12). However, given
the small number of observations, we should not overinterpret this finding.
4 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct two robustness checks. First, we analyze how
the relation between time preferences, academic performance, and study
eﬀort depends on ability. Second, building on that analysis, we reanalyze
the relation between patience and time spent in Mylab conditional on the
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percentage of topics solved, as we would expect weaker eﬀects of impatience
among students who demonstrate good understanding of the course material.
4.1 Heterogeneity in ability
From a theoretical perspective, there is an ambiguous relation between abil-
ity and the eﬀect of impatience on study behavior. One reason is that it is
a priori not clear whether eﬀort and ability are complements or substitutes.
Another reason is that the marginal benefits of eﬀort may be characterized
by strong nonlinearities. Suppose students choose eﬀort to maximize the
following utility function:
 = ( )− ()
where ( ) and () denote, respectively, the future benefits and present
costs of study eﬀort , while  denotes ability and  captures patience.
Assuming the problem is concave, i.e.   0,  ≤ 0,   0, and   0,
it is easily verified that the optimal eﬀort level is increasing in patience :

 =

 −   0 (1)
The impact of a change in  on optimal eﬀort depends on the magnitude of
the terms  and  − . Patience has only a minor eﬀect on the choice
of eﬀort when the marginal benefits of eﬀort  are small, when additional
eﬀort becomes increasingly costly (i.e. when  is large), and when the
benefits of additional eﬀort decline rapidly (i.e. when  is small). The
eﬀect of a change in ability depends on how this change aﬀects these three
terms, either directly ( and ), or indirectly via the implied change
in optimal eﬀort (   ).32 The magnitude of  therefore depends on
ability, but how exactly is impossible to say without imposing additional
assumptions.
The change in the numerator  in response to a change in ability depends
on the sign of the cross-derivative , which is a priori unclear. On the
32The eﬀect of a change in ability is described by

 =

 −  +

[ − ]2 −


 
 −  −
 − 
[ − ]3


The first term captures the change in the numerator of equation (1), its sign depending on
the sign of . The second term captures the direct eﬀect of  on  in the denominator
of equation (1) and can be positive or negative, depending on . The third term
describes the eﬀect of the change in optimal eﬀort when ability changes, i.e.   ,
where  =

− . This gives after rewriting:

 =
 + 
[ − ]2 −
 [ − ]
[ − ]3 
which has an ambiguous sign.
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one hand, one might argue that students of high ability have low marginal
benefits of eﬀort, i.e.   0, since they will pass the exam with a decent
grade anyway. On the other hand, one might argue that study eﬀorts are
more worthwhile for students who have the ability to obtain an outstanding
grade, i.e.   0. A change in ability influences the denominator of
equation (1) both directly and indirectly. There is a direct eﬀect on 
when  6= 0, while there is an indirect eﬀect on  −  via the implied
change in optimal eﬀort,  , which in turn depends on the sign of . This
eﬀect may have the opposite eﬀect on  as the change in the numerator, .
As a result of these two eﬀects, even if we would have a strong prior belief
on the sign of , the eﬀect of a change in ability is still indeterminate
when the marginal cost and benefit functions are characterized by strong
nonlinearities.33
So, from a theoretical perspective, the relation between time preferences,
academic performance, and study eﬀort may be diﬀerent for low and high
ability students, implying that we may obtain more precise estimates when
we analyze both groups separately. Therefore, we split the sample in a low
and high ability group, based on the scores on the mathematics entry test.
Students with a score equal to or above the median are classified as high
ability students, while students with a below median score are classified as
low ability students.
Table 9 reports the results of re-estimating the relations between impa-
tience, study results, and study eﬀort by ability. In all regressions we include,
in addition to the standard control variables, controls for ability, risk atti-
tude, and personality. The key finding is that there are no clear, systematic
diﬀerences between the two samples. The point estimates are in most cases
comparable, although they often lose statistical significance due to the re-
duced sample sizes. So, we do not find that ability diﬀerences systematically
influence the relation between time preferences, academic performance, and
study eﬀort.
4.2 Time spent in MyLab and diﬀerences in understanding
In this section, we apply the theoretical framework described above to the
specific context of the course QM1, which allows us to impose more specific
assumptions on the shape of the marginal benefit function. In particular, we
assume that beyond a certain level of understanding of the course material,
the marginal benefits of studying will decline rapidly towards zero, implying
that the diﬀerences in eﬀort between patient and impatient individuals will
be small and hard to measure empirically. We expect that the diﬀerences
33For instance, assume that   0,   0, and   0. As   0 implies that

  0, an increase in ability implies that marginal eﬀort costs are lower and increase less
rapidly, while the benefits of additional eﬀort decline less rapidly. Changes in impatience
may therefore have a larger eﬀect, despite lower marginal benefits of eﬀort .
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will be more outspoken among students who do not demonstrate a good
understanding of the course material. This prediction can be tested in the
context of the course QM1, as we have information on students’ level of
understanding, namely the fraction of topics completed.
To fix ideas, abstracting from diﬀerences in ability, assume that above
some eﬀort level b students understand the course material perfectly, and
the marginal benefits of eﬀort drop to zero. Stated otherwise, assume that
there is a discontinuity in the marginal benefits of eﬀort:½   0 if   b
 = 0 if  ≥ b
When the marginal eﬀort cost function has a suﬃciently flat slope, all stu-
dents choose b. In other words, all students work until they have a full
understanding of the course material, regardless of their time preferences.
Patience only plays a role when the marginal eﬀort cost function is relatively
steep, implying that the optimal level of eﬀort   b, and that students ac-
cept a lower understanding of the course material.
This example illustrates a more general intuition. One might argue that
the marginal benefits of eﬀort are characterized by an inverse S-shape: the
first hours of study highly contribute to a better understanding of the course
material, but beyond a certain level of understanding, the marginal benefits
of eﬀort decline rapidly, finally leveling oﬀ at zero. When the marginal
benefits of eﬀort decline rapidly, the diﬀerences in eﬀort between patient
and impatient individuals will be small and hard to measure empirically.
Interpreting  ( ) as the level of understanding,34 this can easily be seen
from equation (1): when  goes to −∞,  approaches zero. Arguably,
students who fully understand the course material equate marginal cost and
benefits where  is small and/or steeply declining in eﬀort, implying that
impatience plays no role. By contrast, students who do not demonstrate a
good understanding equate marginal costs and benefits where  is larger
and not yet steeply declining in eﬀort, implying that diﬀerences in patience
are more relevant. Diﬀerences in eﬀort between students may be driven by
diﬀerences in ability, as in the model described above, or by diﬀerences in
motivation.35
To examine this empirically, we distinguish between students who show a
good understanding of the course material and those who do not. In partic-
ular, we estimate the relation between time spent in MyLab and impatience
34Note that in the previous section, we interpreted ( ) more broadly as the benefits
of eﬀort, which can be thought of as a function of the level of understanding. The shape of
the marginal benefit function may be course-specific. In the case of QM1, it is reasonable
to assume strong nonlinearities, as many students obtain one of the highest possible grades.
35A straightforward way to account for individual diﬀerences in motivation would be to
add a term  to the utility function. More motivated individuals, as represented by a
higher value of , exert more eﬀort , which in turn aﬀects  via , , and .
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for individuals who complete more than the median number of topics (i.e. at
least 92.2%), and for those who complete less, respectively. The diﬀerence
between both subgroups in the correlation between time spent in MyLab
and the grade obtained in the course QM1 indicates that this is a meaning-
ful distinction. As noted above, this correlation is positive for students who
complete a below median number of topics (r=0.20), while it is negative for
individuals who complete an above median number of topics (r=—0.30), This
is consistent with the idea that beyond some eﬀort level, additional hours do
not lead to significant improvements in understanding of the course material,
and therefore mainly reflect diﬀerences in ability.
The estimation results are reported in the first two columns of Table
10. We do not find a statistically significant relation in either of the two
samples.36 In columns 3 and 4, we repeat this exercise using a diﬀerent
cut-oﬀ level, namely the 75th percentile (99.4%). Again, we do not find a
statistically significant relationship in either of the samples. The two most
impatient categories of students seem to study fewer hours in the sample
of students who complete at least 99.4% of all topics, but the diﬀerence
with the reference category is far from statistically significant (p=0.38 when
the two most impatient categories are combined into one dummy). In the
light of these findings, it seems unlikely that the absence of a significant
relationship between impatience and study eﬀort is entirely driven by low
and/or rapidly declining marginal benefits of eﬀort.
5 Discussion
The overall picture that arises from our analyses is that impatient individ-
uals show weaker performance, in particular when the consequences are not
too severe (failing a first sit exam) or materialize in the remote future (GPA).
However, we find no evidence that impatient students actually study fewer
hours, and we also do not find clear diﬀerences in summer course participa-
tion. We find a negative relation between impatience and the percentage of
topics completed, but this relation is not very robust. The question is how to
reconcile these findings. If impatient students do not study fewer hours, why
do they obtain lower grades? We can think of four possible explanations.
The first explanation is that impatient students do not spend less time on
their studies, but they spend their time less eﬀectively. For instance, impa-
tient individuals may be more easily distracted, or have a diﬀerent learning
style. There are three reasons why we do not think this is a likely explana-
tion. First, we would expect that diﬀerences in learning styles are reflected
36The number of observations diﬀer between columns 1 and 2, because we use the
median of the fractions of topics completed in the basic sample. The loss in observations
when we include additional variables is not spread evenly over the two groups. None of
our results changes when we use the median of the estimation sample instead.
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in diﬀerences in the amount of time spent on each exercise generated by
MyLab. However, we find no statistically significant diﬀerences, even after
correcting for demographics, ability, and personality. This is in line with
the fact that our qualitative results do not change when we use the number
of exercises in the analyses rather than the amount of time spent on each
exercise.
A second possibility is that impatient students allocate their study eﬀorts
diﬀerently over the course period. A relatively even distribution of study
eﬀorts over time is usually considered a more eﬀective study strategy than
an uneven distribution, e.g. postponing study eﬀorts to the end of the
course period, see Steel et al. (2001). Intuitively, one might expect that
impatient individuals will be more inclined to procrastinate. However, we
should keep in mind that in the course QM1, the midterm exams provide
strong incentives not to do so. It is therefore unlikely that diﬀerences in
the allocation of study eﬀort over time play a role in this particular setting.
Indeed, exploiting the fact that MyLab records study time on a weekly basis,
we do not find diﬀerences in the allocation of study eﬀorts over time.37
Third, we collected survey information on students’ learning styles. This
allows us to check whether impatient individuals report diﬀerent learning
styles, and if they do, to what extent these diﬀerences can explain impatient
individuals’ weaker performance. Based on the learning style model of Ver-
munt and Vermetten (2004), we distinguish between six diﬀerent learning
styles. These learning styles can be subdivided in three cognitive process-
ing strategies, namely deep, stepwise, and concrete processing, and three
metacognitive regulation strategies: self-regulation, external regulation, and
lack of regulation.38 As it turns out, only deep processing is significantly
correlated with time preferences (r=0.08). Given that self-reported learning
styles and time preferences are hardly correlated, it is not surprising that
none of our results is aﬀected by the inclusion of these variables in the regres-
sions. Thus, taken together, we find no indication that impatient students
study less eﬀectively.
The second explanation for our findings is that, by concentrating on
time spent in an electronic learning environment, we ignore important other
dimensions of study eﬀort that explain impatient students’ weaker perfor-
37We examine this hypothesis by running a panel regression with individual and week
fixed eﬀects, where the week fixed eﬀects are interacted with dummies of individuals’ time
preferences. We do not find systematic diﬀerences in the allocation of study eﬀorts over
time.
38Deep processing is defined as relating elements of the subject matter to each other;
stepwise processing (also called surface learning in several theories of learning) refers to
learning facts, definitions, and separate elements of a theory; concrete processing means
applying the subject matter. Self regulation means that students monitor their own learn-
ing process. Alternatively, the learning proces is regulated by external sources (assign-
ments, learning objectives etc.) or poorly regulated, see Vermunt and Vermetten (2004)
for details.
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mance. Since MyLab oﬀers direct feedback and immediate rewards via text
messages ("Correct!, Good!, Congratulations!, Fantastic!, Excellent!"), im-
patient students may have a relatively strong preference for using MyLab
over studying written course materials, implying that we do not find dif-
ferences in measured study eﬀort, despite diﬀerences in total study eﬀort.
This explanation seems unlikely, because we capture study eﬀorts outside
the electronic learning environment by participation in the summer course
and, to a lesser extent, the fraction of topics completed in MyLab. However,
impatient students are not less likely to participate in the summer course
than other students. Moreover, impatient students’ lower first sit exam per-
formance cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the fraction of topics com-
pleted. Furthermore, we find no diﬀerences when we use the total number
of study hours students report in our questionnaire. Although we should be
careful not to overinterpret this result, this finding is suggestive, and largely
consistent with the result on summer course participation. Possibly, patient
students put more eﬀort in studying the written course materials the days
before the exam. However, it is unlikely that this can explain the large di-
vergence in exam performance, as time is limited and all students exert lots
of eﬀort the days before the exam. Therefore, we would expect that there
is too little variation in study eﬀort in this dimension to explain the large
divergence in exam performance.
The third explanation is that impatient students prepare just as well for
the exams as patient students, but they put in less eﬀort to obtain a good
result during the exam. This explanation would be in line with Borghans et
al. (2008), who find that non-cognitive skills, including time preferences, in-
fluence performance on cognitive tests, even when those test are incentivized
(see Segal, 2012, for a similar result). Although this explanation is in line
with the patterns we observe in the data, it seems inconsistent to assume
that impatient students have no diﬃculties with studying as intensively as
patient students, while at the same time assuming that they are not able to
put in similar eﬀort during the exam, during which the marginal to returns
to eﬀort are so much higher than when practicing. We therefore do not
think this is a plausible explanation.
The fourth explanation is that the relation between time preferences and
study results is to some extent spurious. Several studies find that impatience
is associated with lower scores on measures of intelligence, see e.g. Shamosh
and Gray (2008). Because intelligence is typically measured with error, the
negative relation between impatience and study results may be driven by the
inability to suﬃciently correct for diﬀerences in ability. For the same reason,
we may not find the hypothesized negative relation between impatience and
study eﬀorts, as we would expect that, if anything, ability is negatively
correlated with study eﬀorts. So, even if impatient individuals study fewer
hours, we may not find this because our estimations are upward biased.
The patterns in the data are very well in line with this explanation.
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First, in line with previous studies, we find that impatience and ability, as
measured by the score on the mathematics entry test, are negatively corre-
lated (r=—0.13). So, when we control for ability, we typically find that the
relation between impatience and academic performance weakens. Second,
it is suggestive that we find no relation between impatience and time spent
in MyLab, whereas we find a positive relation between impatience and the
percentage of topics completed. These two measures are highly correlated
(r=0.60), but an important diﬀerence between the two is that the former is
not related to the score on the math entry test (r=—0.03), while the latter
is clearly positively correlated (r=0.21). Spurious correlation between im-
patience and intelligence can therefore perfectly account for this diﬀerence
in findings.
As noted above, the inability to suﬃciently correct for diﬀerences in
ability may lead to overestimation of the negative eﬀect of impatience on
exam performance, as well as underestimation of the negative eﬀect of im-
patience on study eﬀort. The former relation seems more vulnerable to bias
than the latter, as the correlation between ability and study eﬀort is very
small empirically (with the exception of the percentage of topics completed).
Hence, if spurious correlation plays a role, the relation between impatience
and study results is probably more severely biased than the relation between
impatience and study eﬀort. So, although the true eﬀect of impatience on
study eﬀorts is uncertain, it is probably rather modest. Finally, it should be
noted that spurious correlation can also arise because of other underlying
variables than intelligence. A logical candidate is social background, which
has been related to academic performance as well as time preferences (see
Björklund and Salvanes, 2011, for a review on the eﬀect of social background
on educational attainment, and Delaney and Doyle, 2012, for evidence on
the link between time preferences and social background). However, social
background can be interpreted as unobserved ability, and therefore most
likely leads to upward bias in the estimated eﬀect of impatience on study
results.
6 Concluding remarks
We analyze the relation between time preferences, study eﬀort, and acad-
emic performance among first-year Business and Economics students. In
line with previous studies (Kirby et al., 2005, Cadena and Keys, 2012, De
Paola and Gioia, 2013, Golsteyn et al., 2014), we find a negative relation
between impatience and first-year academic performance. In particular, im-
patient students obtain lower first sit exam grades, and fail first sit exams
more often. However, we do not find statistically significant eﬀects when the
consequences of bad performance are more severe. Impatient students are
not significantly less likely to obtain all first year’s study credits, and they
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are not less likely to meet the university’s minimal requirements for first
year’s performance. These findings suggest that impatient students’ lower
exam performance is not a consequence of impulsive behavior, but rather
suggests that students make rational trade-oﬀs, thereby avoiding strong ad-
verse consequences of impatient behavior.
The main contribution of our study is that we relate time preferences
to direct measures of study eﬀort. In particular, we measure the time stu-
dents spend practicing in an electronic learning environment, their practice
results, and whether they participate in an online summer course. We find
no evidence that impatient students study fewer hours or participate less
often in the summercourse. Students’ practice results are negatively related
to impatience, but this relation appears not very robust. Our measures
of eﬀort therefore cannot explain impatient students’ weaker first sit exam
performance. The most likely explanation is that the relation between im-
patience and academic performance is to some extent spurious, as impatient
individuals are of lower ability. To the extent that ability is unobserved or
measured with error, the negative impact of impatience on academic per-
formance is overestimated, and the impact on actual study eﬀorts may be
smaller than suggested by the diﬀerences in performance.
When interpreting those results, we should keep the specific setting in
mind. Students face strong incentives to study regularly, as in most courses
they have the opportunity to take at least one midterm test and they are
required to attend weekly tutorials, where active participation is expected.
In this sense, this is a strong test of the hypothesis that impatient students
put less eﬀort into their studies. Our findings are therefore not at odds with
previous findings. However, the fact that we find substantial eﬀects of im-
patience on grades and first sit exam results, despite insignificant diﬀerences
in study hours, sheds new light on existing studies, as it suggests that the
eﬀects of impatience on educational performance are overestimated. This
underlines the importance of using direct measures of study eﬀort.
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Table 2: Impatience and grades QM1 
 
 
Method: Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.380* ‐0.159 ‐0.127 ‐0.257 ‐0.073
(0.215) (0.192) (0.187) (0.179) (0.156)
Always Immediate ‐1.102*** ‐0.726*** ‐0.628*** ‐0.649*** ‐0.475***
(0.233) (0.216) (0.213) (0.196) (0.169)
Score entry test Math 0.285*** 0.262*** 0.252*** 0.112***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030)
(Score entry test Math)^2 ‐0.007 ‐0.008 ‐0.005 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Score entry test Statistics 0.056 0.079 0.108* 0.122**
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.053)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 0.113*** 0.100*** 0.094*** 0.056**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027)
Mathematics major 0.956*** 0.863*** 0.895*** 0.650***
(0.193) (0.194) (0.185) (0.156)
Risk attitude ‐0.185*** ‐0.142** ‐0.052
(0.070) (0.066) (0.056)
Anxiety ‐0.322*** ‐0.339*** ‐0.137**
(0.067) (0.064) (0.059)
Persistence ‐0.086 ‐0.146 ‐0.285***
(0.112) (0.111) (0.098)
Self‐belief 0.152 0.141 ‐0.069
(0.132) (0.122) (0.107)
Summer course 0.046 ‐0.073
(0.199) (0.178)
Time in MyLab 0.031*** ‐0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
1/100*(Time in MyLab)^2 ‐0.067***
(0.008)
Expected grade 0.709***
(0.088)
Fraction of topics completed 4.174***
(0.305)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes yes
Study Program and tutor quality yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 791 779 778 778 769
Pseudo r2 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
Grade first sit exam QM1
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
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 Table 3: Impatience and probability of failing exam QM1 
Method: Probit (1=fail, 0=pass)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Switch when delayed is €1250 0.031 0.005 0.004 0.026 0.009
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Always Immediate 0.125*** 0.085** 0.071* 0.084** 0.069*
(0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039)
Score entry test Math ‐0.038*** ‐0.035*** ‐0.034*** ‐0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
(Score entry test Math)^2 0.001 0.001 0.000 ‐0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Score entry test Statistics 0.007 0.005 0.000 ‐0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 ‐0.012* ‐0.011* ‐0.010* ‐0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Mathematics major ‐0.135*** ‐0.127*** ‐0.138*** ‐0.117***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)
Risk attitude 0.014 0.007 ‐0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Anxiety 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Persistence 0.037* 0.050** 0.056***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Self‐belief ‐0.045* ‐0.042* ‐0.019
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021)
Summer course ‐0.046 ‐0.030
(0.033) (0.032)
Time in MyLab ‐0.004*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
1/100*(Time in MyLab)^2 0.009***
(0.002)
Expected grade ‐0.069***
(0.017)
Fraction of topics completed ‐0.515***
(0.066)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes yes
Study Program and tutor quality yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 791 779 778 778 769
Pseudo R^2 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
Coefficients report mean marginal effects.
Failed first sit exam QM1
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
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Method: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.094 ‐0.003 0.019 ‐0.035 0.060 0.069
(0.105) (0.101) (0.099) (0.096) (0.088) (0.069)
Always Immediate ‐0.507*** ‐0.358*** ‐0.295*** ‐0.306*** ‐0.225** ‐0.096
(0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.106) (0.097) (0.083)
Score entry test Math 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.098*** 0.029* ‐0.007
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
(Score entry test Math)^2 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.008* 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Score entry test Statistics 0.064* 0.076** 0.096*** 0.104*** 0.073***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.025)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 0.024 0.016 0.012 ‐0.005 ‐0.020*
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Mathematics major 0.128 0.078 0.112 0.010 ‐0.171**
(0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.084) (0.071)
Risk attitude ‐0.122*** ‐0.102*** ‐0.065** ‐0.054**
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.025)
Anxiety ‐0.168*** ‐0.184*** ‐0.089*** ‐0.045*
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.024)
Persistence ‐0.061 ‐0.101* ‐0.161*** ‐0.073
(0.061) (0.059) (0.053) (0.045)
Self‐belief 0.144** 0.138** 0.032 0.036
(0.067) (0.064) (0.060) (0.048)
Summer course 0.023 ‐0.037 ‐0.010
(0.111) (0.099) (0.080)
Time in MyLab 0.016*** ‐0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1/100*(Time in MyLab)^2 ‐0.026***
(0.005)
Expected grade 0.354*** 0.153***
(0.046) (0.037)
Fraction of topics completed 1.813*** 0.338**
(0.177) (0.170)
Grade first sit exam QM1 0.370***
(0.020)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes yes yes
Study Program yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 799 785 784 784 775 769
R‐squared 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.60
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
GPA all courses except QM1
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
 
Table 4: Impatience and GPA all courses except QM1 
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Method: Ols
Dependent Variable: Number of 
ECTS (if <60) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Switch when delayed is €1250 0.041 ‐0.047 0.020 0.044 2.006 ‐0.036 ‐0.046*
(0.112) (0.110) (0.041) (0.043) (2.140) (0.027) (0.025)
Always Immediate 0.420*** 0.275** ‐0.113** ‐0.072 1.765 0.018 ‐0.006
(0.124) (0.120) (0.048) (0.050) (2.056) (0.032) (0.028)
Score entry test Math ‐0.065*** 0.025*** 0.587* ‐0.011**
(0.019) (0.008) (0.313) (0.005)
(Score entry test Math)^2 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 0.089 ‐0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.076) (0.001)
Score entry test Statistics ‐0.093** 0.004 0.607 ‐0.005
(0.036) (0.014) (0.649) (0.009)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 ‐0.018 0.013* 0.553 ‐0.009*
(0.019) (0.007) (0.355) (0.005)
Mathematics major ‐0.165 0.041 2.978 ‐0.062**
(0.108) (0.043) (1.992) (0.024)
Risk attitude 0.105*** ‐0.042*** ‐0.938 0.024***
(0.039) (0.016) (0.694) (0.009)
Anxiety 0.159*** ‐0.047*** ‐1.201 0.018*
(0.040) (0.015) (0.732) (0.009)
Persistence 0.088 ‐0.006 ‐0.386 0.006
(0.066) (0.027) (1.176) (0.016)
Self‐belief ‐0.146* 0.084*** 0.259 ‐0.023
(0.075) (0.031) (1.232) (0.018)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Study Program yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 799 784 799 784 354 799 784
(Pseudo) R‐squared 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
Coefficients of probit models report mean marginal effects.
Always delayed or switch 
when delayed is €1100 Reference
Neg. Binomial Regression
Number of failed courses Obtained all ECTS  Received BSA
Probit Probit
 
 
Table 5: Impatience and first-year academic performance 
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Method: Quantile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Switch when delayed is €1250 3.83* 2.55 0.09 2.44 2.67
(1.98) (1.93) (1.92) (1.92) (1.85)
Always Immediate 1.21 ‐0.68 ‐2.37 ‐0.82 ‐0.78
(2.27) (2.22) (2.22) (2.21) (2.14)
Score entry test Math ‐0.25 ‐0.08 ‐0.23 ‐0.23
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32)
(Score entry test Math)^2 ‐0.10 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Score entry test Statistics ‐1.69*** ‐2.03*** ‐1.78*** ‐1.83***
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.62)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 0.16 0.67** 0.56* 0.48
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
Mathematics major ‐2.80 ‐3.45* ‐1.14 ‐0.65
(1.89) (1.88) (1.90) (1.83)
Summer course 8.35*** 6.96***
(2.16) (2.10)
Risk attitude ‐0.33 ‐0.23 ‐0.29
(0.69) (0.69) (0.67)
Anxiety 2.31*** 2.43*** 2.13***
(0.68) (0.68) (0.66)
Persistence 4.16*** 3.42*** 3.41***
(1.18) (1.18) (1.14)
Self‐belief ‐1.34 ‐1.58 ‐1.54
(1.36) (1.37) (1.32)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes yes
Study Program yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 798 785 784 784 767
Pseudo R‐squared 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
Time logged in in MyLab
 
 
Table 6: Study efforts: time spent in electronic learning environment 
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Method:  Probit  OLS
Sample:  Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.026 ‐0.015 ‐0.016 0.026 0.028
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.028) (0.034)
Always Immediate ‐0.124** ‐0.105** ‐0.104** ‐0.028 0.028
(0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.031) (0.037)
Score entry test Math 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.012**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
(Score entry test Math)^2 ‐0.004* ‐0.004** ‐0.003** ‐0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Score entry test Statistics ‐0.011 ‐0.010 0.003 ‐0.025**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Mathematics major 0.010 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.025
(0.043) (0.043) (0.026) (0.032)
Risk attitude ‐0.053*** ‐0.043*** ‐0.024*
(0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Anxiety ‐0.002 ‐0.030*** ‐0.006
(0.016) (0.010) (0.012)
Persistence 0.039 0.034* 0.028
(0.027) (0.018) (0.019)
Self‐belief 0.059** ‐0.003 0.004
(0.030) (0.020) (0.021)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes yes
Study Program yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 798 785 784 784 383
(Pseudo)‐R2 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
Coefficients of probit models report mean marginal effects.
Dependent variable:
Full sample
ReferenceAlways delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100
Below median 
score
All topics 
completed
Probit 
Fraction of topics 
completed
Above median fraction of topics 
completed (1=above median score)
 
Table 7: Study efforts: fraction of topics completed in MyLab 
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Method: Probit (1=participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.010 ‐0.014 ‐0.052 0.013
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.044)
Always Immediate 0.008 0.004 ‐0.044 0.037
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.051)
Mathematics major ‐0.098***
(0.027)
Risk attitude ‐0.006 0.007 ‐0.012
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Anxiety 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
Persistence 0.023 0.034 0.018
(0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
Self‐belief 0.074*** 0.077** 0.076**
(0.024) (0.031) (0.031)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes
Study Program yes yes yes yes
Observations 799 792 271 521
Observations  dep. var.=1 162 159 35 124
Observations dep. var.=0 637 633 236 397
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Coefficients report mean marginal effects.
Participation in summer course
Sample: 
Math major
Sample: 
Math minor
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
 
Table 8: Study efforts: participation in summer course 
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Dependent variable Grade Probability GPA  Number of ECTS  probability Total hours Fraction
QM1 of failing failed of negative logged in  of topics
exam QM1 exams BSA in MyLab completed
Method tobit probit ols neg. binomial probit probit quantile reg. probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Switch when delayed is €1250 0.108 ‐0.047* 0.049 ‐0.053 0.065 ‐0.052** 2.817 ‐0.000
(0.262) (0.026) (0.131) (0.174) (0.053) (0.025) (2.293) (0.057)
Always Immediate ‐0.613** 0.016 ‐0.348** 0.299 ‐0.038 0.018 ‐2.840 ‐0.123*
(0.304) (0.035) (0.159) (0.197) (0.067) (0.033) (2.779) (0.070)
Observations 438 438 440 440 440 440 440 440
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.414 0.087 ‐0.012 ‐0.038 0.016 ‐0.031 1.468 ‐0.040
(0.268) (0.067) (0.160) (0.142) (0.067) (0.048) (3.662) (0.067)
Always Immediate ‐0.692** 0.138* ‐0.231 0.231 ‐0.107 ‐0.027 1.452 ‐0.081
(0.296) (0.074) (0.162) (0.149) (0.072) (0.052) (3.990) (0.073)
Observations 340 340 344 344 344 344 344 344
Results QM1 Results other courses Study Effort
Always delayed or switch 
when delayed is €1100 Reference
Always delayed or switch 
when delayed is €1100 Reference
High ability (score on math entrytest ≥7)
Low ability (score on math entrytest<7)
Standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients of probit models report mean marginal effects. In 
all regressions, we control for age, gender, nationality, study program, tutor quality (in case of QM1), entry test scores on 
mathematics and statistics, demeaned entry test scores on mathematics and statistics squared, pre‐education, risk attitude, 
anxiety, persistence, and self‐belief.
 
 
Table 9: Estimation results by ability 
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Method: Quantile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch when delayed is €1250 3.99 0.06 3.67 ‐2.95
(3.31) (2.28) (2.52) (3.67)
Always Immediate 0.38 ‐0.77 ‐1.92 ‐3.42
(3.60) (2.85) (2.84) (4.62)
Score entry test Math ‐0.29 ‐0.48 ‐0.78* ‐0.01
(0.56) (0.42) (0.43) (0.70)
(Score entry test Math)^2 ‐0.07 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.19
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19)
Score entry test Statistics ‐2.82** ‐0.82 ‐2.19*** ‐0.25
(1.13) (0.76) (0.84) (1.27)
(Score entry test Statistics)^2 0.85 0.34 0.31 0.35
(0.53) (0.38) (0.42) (0.58)
Mathematics major ‐5.02 ‐1.99 ‐2.94 ‐2.78
(3.24) (2.23) (2.50) (3.64)
Risk attitude ‐1.49 1.51* ‐0.38 1.65
(1.20) (0.81) (0.93) (1.31)
Anxiety 0.95 3.28*** 2.01** 3.59***
(1.17) (0.81) (0.93) (1.22)
Persistence 3.36* 2.55* 4.56*** 2.34
(1.89) (1.52) (1.50) (2.65)
Self‐belief ‐0.72 ‐3.54* ‐1.47 ‐6.00*
(2.08) (1.83) (1.70) (3.05)
Gender, Age, Nationality yes yes yes yes
Study Program yes yes yes yes
Observations 383 401 584 200
Pseudo R‐squared 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Quadratic terms are demeaned.
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
Time logged in in MyLab
Below 75th 
percentile
Above 75th 
percentile
Below 
Median
Sample: Fraction of topics completed:
Above 
Median
 
 
Table 10: Time spent in MyLab by level of understanding 
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Appendix: Figures 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of time preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of entry test scores mathematics 
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Figure A3: Distribution of grades QM1 
 
 
Figure A4: Distribution of GPA (excluding grade QM1) 
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Figure A5: Distribution of the number of failed first sit exams 
 
 
Figure A6: Distribution of the number of ECTS 
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Figure A7: Distribution of time spent in MyLab 
 
 
Figure A8: Distribution of fraction of topics completed 
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